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Each day in a large teaching hospital, there are hundreds or more
discussions among health care providers about deviations from opti-
mal patient care; such discussions are integral to the dual missions of
delivering health care and educating future health care providers. Not
all of the errors discussed are recorded in the charts. Very few of
them make their way to the written error documentation systems in
the hospital, such as the incident reports or potential claims files.
Fewer still serve as the basis for insurance claims or malpractice
litigation.
The Institute of Medicine's (IOM) report, To Err is Human, at-
tempted to estimate the frequency of medical error. The report stated
that preventable medical errors cause anywhere from 44,000 to 98,000
deaths per year.1 But the statistics available to the IOM about error
were mainly derived from medical records or lawsuits. Since good
policy begins with good facts, it is useful to study medical errors in situ
and determine how current practices of professional self-regulation,
institutional collection of data on errors, and the medical malpractice
system each function to identify, rectify, or deter errors.
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Director, Institute for Sci-
ence, Law and Technology, Illinois Institute of Technology. This study would not have been
possible without the intellectual aid of Carol Stocking, Ph.D. I am also indebted to the four
observers-Karen Freel, Will Kelley, Patsy Spyer, and Dan Wolk-and other project partici-
pants-Mary Catherine Hendron, Richard Lipinski, Mark Granfors, Cynthia Morgan, Alfred
Darnell, Anthony Maier, and Roz Caldwell. This project was made possible by grants from the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the M.D. Anderson Foundation, and the American Bar
Foundation and was undertaken with co-investigators Dr. Mark Siegler, Dr. Thomas Krizek, Dr.
Lawrence Gottlieb, Dr. Thomas Vargish, Claudette Krizek, and Dr. Carol Stocking. I am espe-
cially grateful to the American Bar Foundation, which through institutional support and the aid
provided by its community of research fellows, contributed immeasurably to this project. A
preliminary account of the incidence of errors is reported in Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alterna-
tive Strategy for Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349 LANCET 309 (1997).
1. INST. OF MED., To ERR is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda T. Kohn
et al. eds., 2000).
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Fifteen years ago, with funding from the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, the M.D. Anderson Foundation, and the American Bar
Foundation, we began a prospective observational study of the nature,
incidence, and causes of errors identified by health care providers in
work rounds and clinical meetings. We compared informal error iden-
tification mechanisms to the formal institutional mechanisms for iden-
tifying errors and to the patient-initiated mechanisms of identifying
errors through complaints and claims. The central finding of the study
was that the rate of errors was high. Nearly half of all patients had
errors in their care. Nearly one in five patients had errors with a seri-
ous harm.2 Yet very little was done to prevent further errors. The
person who committed the error was rarely held accountable. And,
when the error was caused by an administrative problem (such as
faulty equipment), the administration was rarely informed, so it did
not have the opportunity to correct the situation to prevent future
errors. The findings of this study point to a crying need to find other
means of pressuring or inducing hospitals to identify, remedy, and
prevent medical errors. This Article discusses our data and then ana-
lyzes policies that require disclosure of errors by physicians, or those
who witness the physician's work, to the patient and the hospital in
order to encourage more error prevention activities.
II. PROJECT METHODOLOGY
The guiding questions of the study were: What is the incidence of
errors identified through various mechanisms in a hospital? What
causes such errors? What responses do the health care providers or
hospital administrators make when an error occurs? What responses
do patients make to such errors? Finally, how well do formalized re-
porting mechanisms within a hospital function in identifying errors,
providing an early warning system about errors that might result in
lawsuits, and providing an indication about the quality of the hospi-
tal's services?
The centerpiece of the project was a prospective observational
study of the internal hospital system of work rounds and clinical meet-
ings in which health care providers themselves identified and re-
sponded to errors in the care of surgical patients. The focus was on
the care of hospitalized patients of surgeons because, although medi-
cal maloccurrences leading to litigation can occur anywhere in the
health care system (for example, in physicians' offices, nursing homes,
2. The actual number might be even higher, since for many patients the level of harm was not
discussed by the health care providers.
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or laboratories), approximately 80% of patients' claims of malpractice
revolve around an incident in a hospital. 3 Moreover, in approximately
one-third of hospital claims, surgeons are the principal defendants.
4
We assigned trained ethnographers to shadow surgeons and other
health care professionals and hospital employees who cared for surgi-
cal patients in a particular hospital. The observers attended all regu-
larly scheduled gatherings at which there were discussions about the
care of patients admitted to ten different surgical services.5 These
gatherings were of two types. The first were work rounds, at which
residents or attendings led a health care team from one patient's room
to another. The second were clinical meetings, at which a group of
health care workers met to discuss patient care; these meetings in-
cluded those held at the unit level (such as nursing shift changes and
case conferences) and those held at the section or departmental level
(such as morbidity and mortality conferences and quality assurance
reviews).
This was a study of the behind-the-scenes discussions of errors by
health care workers (nurses, medical students, interns, residents, at-
tending physicians, administrators, pharmacy workers, and others).
The observers did not make judgments about whether errors had oc-
curred, but rather took notes-and later coded-the description of
the errors provided by the health care workers. 6 The health care
workers discussed their own errors and the errors of other health care
workers. For purposes of the study, errors were defined as incidents
in which a health care provider or other hospital employee was said to
have undertaken an action (or failed to undertake an action) when, at
the time, an alternative, more appropriate action was possible. The
definition of errors did not include bad outcomes caused by the pa-
tient's condition or by an acceptable risk inherent in a particular pro-
cedure. For a subset of incidents which met our definition of error,
3. See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N. INS. COMM'RS, MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CLOSED CLAIMS 1975-1978 (1980); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984 (Apr. 1987), available at http://161.203.16.4/d2t4/
132815.pdf.
4. See, e.g., OHIO Hosp. Assoc., Bulletin 88 - 052A: Analysis of 1986 Closed Claims Survey
Data, Part Four April 1988, at 6.
5. The surgical services were kidney transplant, liver transplant, orthopedic, plastic surgery/
burns, thoracic, urology, vascular, and the three divisions of general surgery (gastrointestinal,
oncology, and trauma).
6. The observers recorded extensive information about the discussion of each error, including:
a description of the error; who identified it: what was indicated by the health care workers to be
the cause of the error; what was indicated to be the effect on the patient; who, if anyone, was
blamed; and any responses to the error that were mentioned. The observers neither asked ques-
tions nor made medical judgments.
2005]
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the incident at issue was specifically characterized as an error by one
or more of the health care workers discussing it.
The observational portion of the study provided data on the infor-
mal mechanisms used by health care providers at work rounds and
clinical meetings to identify errors in patient care. The hospital ad-
ministration did not receive reports from those settings and thus had
no idea about the high incidence of errors being discussed by their
health care providers.
Other strands of the study collected data on the formal institutional
mechanisms for identifying errors. Data were collected from patient
occurrence reports-standardized reporting forms that are filed (usu-
ally by nurses) with the hospital's legal department to record certain
categories of errors, such as medication errors, patient falls, or intra-
venous line problems. Data were also collected from potential claim
files. These are files opened by the legal department when a health
care provider (usually a physician) calls to indicate that an incident
has occurred about which the patient might sue. Lastly, data were
collected on actual patient claims, in which patients sued or otherwise
made demands for compensation on the grounds that an error was
committed in their care. We then expanded the study and analyzed
hospital-wide data on all patients for a two-year period, not just those
of the ten surgical services in which we collected observational data.
We analyzed background information about the patients and informa-
tion from potential claim files and open claim files which included a
wide range of rich data, such as how (if at all) the patient learned of
an error in his or her care, what the patient's relationship with his or
her physician was, and how much money the hospital had set aside to
pay the patient if he or she later brought a claim. We tracked the
malpractice cases involving our observational patients for fifteen
years. One case involved a settlement fourteen years after the error.
III. INCIDENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF ERROR
The study reported here is unique in its prospective nature and the
intimate look it provides into the workings of health care providers.
The one-of-a-kind nature of the study and the lessons that can be
gleaned from it make it worth considering the data in great detail to
understand the factors contributing to the high incidence of errors in
hospitals, who gets blamed for the errors, whether errors get corrected
and prevented, and what circumstances lead to patients' lawsuits.
It became clear within the first week that an observational study in
a hospital was much different than one in a law firm or a corpora-
tion-and that the difference was going to work to our advantage.
360 [Vol. 54:357
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Much of the focus of both the teaching enterprise and the health care
enterprise in the hospital was on identifying and dealing with error.
The health care workers could not stop those discussions just because
we were there or the entire system would grind to a halt.
In addition, it was much easier to be a fly on the wall in the hospital
setting because of the enormous turnover in participants at the vari-
ous meetings we attended. Medical students rotated through the
meetings on a monthly schedule. Residents stayed for three months.
Nurses changed shifts. There were always new faces in the settings we
studied, so we did not stick out as odd. And, because new students,
residents, and nurses were constantly being added, errors needed to
be discussed in relatively simple ways to make sure the newcomers
understood what should have been done. Often errors were discussed
in an obvious way, such as when a surgeon said, "I must have been
brain-dead when I did that" or when a critical care physician said,
"You never do that to a diabetic."
At one of the first meetings that I attended with an observer, the
attending physician said, "Oh, the observers are here. Now we can't
talk about our mistakes or tell dirty jokes." Within five minutes,
though, he had done both.
The observers attended work rounds and clinical meetings over a
nine-month period and chronicled discussions by health care workers
involving the care of 1047 patients.7 At least one error was identified
by the health care workers in the care of 480 (45.8%) of the 1047
patients in the units studied. No errors were mentioned about the
care of 567 patients (54.2%); one error for 15.1% of patients; two to
five errors for 20.5% of patients; and more than five errors for the
remaining 10.2% of patients in the study population.8 Errors seriously
impacted 17.7% of the patients, ranging from temporary disability to
death. 9
There were a total of 2183 errors, over four errors per patient with
an error. Serious injury occurred from 462 errors (21.2%). For 1360
errors (62.3%), the seriousness of its effect was not disclosed.' 0 Only
7. With respect to demographics, 52% of patients were male, 46% were Caucasian, and 43%
African-American. The primary payment source was third party payors (49.5%), Medicaid or
uninsured (22.1%), and Medicare (29.3%). The patients were in the hospital during the time
period from July 1, 1989 through March 31, 1990. Data on their subsequent legal claims were
collected through March 31, 2004.
8. See infra app. A, fig. 1.
9. For purposes of the study, serious injury was defined as either a temporary physical disabil-
ity, permanent disability, or death.
10. We were interested in casting a broad net in classifying errors. Consequently, our defini-
tion of error did not require a discussion of actual harm to the patient. We did so for two
2005]
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321 (14.7%) of the errors reported said to have caused no harm to the
patient.
The 17.7% of patients who had errors with a serious impact is sig-
nificantly higher than the 3.7% rate of errors with similarly serious
effects found in the Harvard Medical Practice Study of 30,121 medical
records of New York hospital patients."1 This disparity is understand-
able, since one would not expect that all errors that health care work-
ers identify would be recorded in patients' records.12 In fact, some
physicians in the study indicated that they did not include information
about errors in the patient's chart because they wanted to avoid
litigation.
A. Causes of Errors
Although this was a study of discussions addressing the care of sur-
gical patients, only 10.5% of errors and 19.7% of serious errors re-
lated to surgery per se. 13 More frequent overall were errors involving
monitoring and daily care-most often, the follow-up care to surgery.
reasons. First, since our data were collected from coding the existing discussions of health care
workers (and not interacting with them through questions), we could not be certain that a failure
to mention that harm had occurred to the patient meant that there was no harm to the patient.
(For example, if the patient had suffered such serious harm that all the health care workers
already knew about it, they might not have felt the need to bring up that fact at a particular
meeting.) Even in circumstances in which the health care workers actually stated that the pa-
tient had suffered no harm or minor harm, we were still interested in collecting data about the
error. In some instances, the potential harm of the error was averted by an intervening action of
another health care worker, by the patient, or by sheer luck. Despite the fact that no harm
occurred in that particular instance, collecting data about the error was important in developing
means to prevent future potentially harmful instances of such errors.
11. See generally HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK
(1990).
12. Indeed, prospective studies of certain types of care report much higher rates than the
Harvard study found. For example, Robert Brook's classic 1970 study found that only 27% of
one cohort of patients seeking care in an emergency room received "minimally adequate medi-
cal care." See generally Robert H. Brook et al., Effectiveness of Nonemergency Care Via an
Emergency Room, 78 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 333 (1973). Another study found that 36% of
815 consecutive patients had an iatrogenic illness, and 9% had an iatrogenic event that was life
threatening or produced a disability. See generally Knight Steel et al., Iatrogenic Illness on a
General Medical Service at a University Hospital, 304 NEW ENG. J: MED. 638 (1981). Meyers
reports that "[tihere is evidence, derived mainly from studies of hospital patients, that the de-
nominator of iatrogenic illness and injury is large." Allan R. Meyers, "Lumping It": The Hidden
Denominator of the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1544, 1544 (1987).
13. The fact that problems in the surgery per se were not the focus of most discussions of
untoward errors is also indicated by an analysis of where the errors occurred. Of the 2183 errors
discussed in the study settings, nearly three-quarters of those in which a location was known and
coded (of 2183, 789 are missing on the "where" variable) occurred in the patient's room.
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Monitoring and daily care made up 29.3% of errors and 17.1% of seri-
ous errors.
14
The causes of errors that were identified by the health care workers
could be categorized into three main types: individual, interactive, and
administrative. 15 One or more causes were mentioned for just over
half of the errors. Of those errors, 37.8% were said to have been
caused by an individual, for example by poor technical performance,
poor judgment, and failure to act on or failure to obtain information.
Further, of these errors, 15.6% had causes related to the interaction
between health care providers, services or entities in the hospital, such
as poor communication between services, inadequate training, or poor
communication to a subordinate or to a superior; 9.8% had causes
related generally to administrative decisions and protocols-for exam-
ple, defective or unavailable equipment or inadequate staffing.
16
The study results highlight the need for attention to a wide range of
potential causes of errors. Although the practice of medicine is often
viewed as an individual effort between doctor and patient (and most
policy recommendations and preventive strategies are focused on that
individual effort), the prevalence of errors with interactive or adminis-
trative causes (25.4%) underscores the influence of the interrelation-
ship between health care professionals and administrative actions that
impact errors.
B. Correlates of Errors
We performed various statistical analyses, such as logistic regression
analyses, to determine whether there was some attribute of the pa-
tient, the patient's condition, or the hospital experience that was cor-
related with errors. For example, we wondered if there were more
discussions of errors in the care of African-American patients. Basic
patient demographics such as gender, race, and payor status were not
correlated with the incidence of errors in our study. However, we
found evidence of a larger number of errors in older and sicker pa-
tients. The likelihood of having an error increased by about 6% for
each day spent in the hospital.
Length of stay was significantly correlated with having an initial er-
ror and having an initial serious error. In addition, having a serious
error prolonged the hospital stay. An event history analysis 17 deter-
mined that patients who had a serious error were 74% less likely to be
14. See infra app. A, fig. 2.
15. Some errors had other causes.
16. See infra app. A, fig. 3.
17. DAVID ROXBEE COX & D.O. OAKES, ANALYSIS OF SURVIVAL DATA (1984).
20051
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discharged on any given day after the error than were patients who
did not have a serious error.
IV. RESPONSE TO ERROR BY HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
While many other studies have attempted to determine the inci-
dence of medical errors, and some have analyzed the causes, this study
is relatively unique in its collection of data on health care providers'
responses to errors and the hospital's response. We were able to study
the process by which the health care providers determined that some-
thing was an error, when and how they assigned blame, and when and
how they took action in response to the error.
A. Labeling the Adverse Event as an Error
For 61.9% of the incidents that met the study definition of error, at
least one health care worker discussing the error specifically charac-
terized it as an error. With respect to 128 or 6.1% more of the inci-
dents, there was a dispute over whether the incident was an error.
The patient demographic characteristics and the illness variables did
not have a statistically significant effect on whether an incident was
labeled an error; nor did the seriousness of the event influence
whether the event was labeled an error. However, the odds of an
event being termed an error increased as the status of the person who
omitted or committed the error decreased. Residents were more
likely to be said to have caused errors than attendings.
B. Blame as a Response
For most errors, the health care worker or workers discussing the
error assigned blame to an individual or hospital entity for causing the
error.18 Blame was less likely to be assigned when the error resulted
in serious harm.t 9 Blame was assigned in 42.8% of the cases of serious
harm, compared to 52.8% of the cases resulting in no-harm and non-
18. Whether or not the event was called an error and whether or not it had an identified cause
were significantly related to whether blame was assigned. Naming an event an error increased
the odds of blame being assigned six-fold. If the event was said to be caused by an individual,
blame assignment was four times more likely. However, having a systems-caused error reduced
the odds of blame assignment three-fold. Thus, when a maloccurrence in patient care is caused
by an individual health care practitioner, blame is more likely to be assigned than when the
cause is attributed to the hospital administration.
19. Chi-square, p = .00010.
[Vol. 54:357
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serious harm.20 Blame was significantly more likely to be placed if the
harm was averted by skill than if it was not.
2
'
We explored whether there was a tendency for the health care
worker to blame outsiders-that is, individuals or entities that were
not part of their own health care team. Among the errors which the
observers could code on this variable, the identifier of the error
blamed him or herself or a member of his or her team for 42.5% of
errors and blamed an outsider for 57.5% of errors. However, those
outsiders-physicians and other workers from other departments-
were often not contacted and told about their errors.
By themselves, none of the variables associated with the patient's
characteristics or the patient's illness were statistically significant in a
prediction of whether blame was assigned. However, in a more com-
prehensive regression analysis, blame was more likely to be found if
an error happened to a white person (twice as likely), happened to a
person who was an emergency admission (increases odds by 50%),
had an individual cause (four times as likely), or was labeled an error
(more than six times as likely).
C. Health Care Provider's Response to Error
Health care providers responded to the errors that they or others
pointed out in the meetings observers attended. With respect to two-
thirds of the errors, the participants in the meetings discussed a re-
sponse to the error. The majority of responses were corrective, deal-
ing with providing a medical response to the immediate needs of a
particular patient. This included changing medication, doing a subse-
quent surgery, and re-admission to the hospital for discharged pa-
tients. There were only a few instances in which the errors led the
health care workers to think systematically about a problem and to
devise a response that involved preventing future errors rather than
correcting them after the fact. In 68.7% of the errors (which had a
response) there was a response aimed at correcting the immediate
problem, compared to less than 1% with a response aimed at devising
specific means for preventing future errors. In fact, more errors (4%)
had responses aimed at talking to patients to cool them out than re-
sponses aimed at preventing future errors.
22
20. Blame was assigned in 60.7% of the cases of no harm, which was significantly greater than
the 49.0% of the cases with any harm (p = .00018) in a chi-square.
21. Chi-square, p = .01541.
22. Some of the responses given were significantly different if the person blamed was not a
member of the home service. Similarly, notifying a superordinate was significantly (p = .00275)
more likely to occur about someone from a different service. It only occurred for 0.4% of the
2005]
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With respect to whether the health care professionals suggested that
a response be made to a patient's error, serious errors were nearly
twice as likely to prompt a response.2 3 The likelihood of an error get-
ting a response was increased by 50% if the error was labeled an er-
ror. However, when blame was assigned, the likelihood of a response
decreased by almost two-thirds. This latter finding suggests that
blame itself may be considered a response-and that once a particular
individual has been blamed for a maloccurrence, the collective group
of health care professionals discussing the error may not put as much
effort into finding another response, such as taking action to prevent
future errors.
Although there were no significant demographic differences in who
had errors, there were differences in how cause was assessed, how
blame was assigned, and how errors were responded to, depending on
the gender, race, and socioeconomic status of the patient. Women and
poorer patients were more likely to be said to be the cause of their
errors. When an African-American was the subject of an error, there
was a greater tendency to blame an amorphous entity ("Them").
When a Caucasian was the subject of an error, there was more of a
tendency to blame an identified individual.
Also, the responses to errors in the care of disadvantaged patients(African-Americans, women, and the poor) were different than re-
sponses to errors in the care of advantaged patients. If an error oc-
curred in the care of a woman or an African-American, the health
care professionals were less likely to use the error to make a change to
prevent future errors. After errors in the care of male patients, the
health care providers were more likely to change the protocol to pre-
vent future errors.
errors involving a member of the home service, as compared to 2.7% of the errors involving
members of a different service. Incident reports were significantly more likely (p = .01701) to be
written about someone of a different service. In fact, all eight incident reports were about some-
one from a different service. All instances of calling legal affairs (n = 5, p = .05953) were aboutindividuals from a different service. Nevertheless, even for members of another service, this
responding was low. Only 1.2% of errors blamed on members of other services were written up
in incident reports and only 0.7% of errors blamed on members of other services served as thebasis for a call to legal affairs. Cooling out the patient was also significantly (p = .01042) morelikely to occur when the blame was a member of another service (3.3% of cases, compared to
1.0% of cases).
23. The coded responses included medical responses (such as redoing a surgery), social re-
sponses (such as having a social worker talk to the patient), unofficial responses (such as talking
to the blamee), and official responses (such as changing a protocol to prevent future harm to
other patients).
[Vol. 54:357
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D. Blame and Responses as Incentives to Error Prevention
The clinical meetings we studied are generally considered to be the
place where self-regulation is at its best and physicians are held ac-
countable for their errors. However, in those settings, blame was not
commonly assigned to the highest ranking physicians.2 4 With respect
to only 8.7% of the errors discussed was the attending physician
blamed. The actions of an attending were not likely to be called an
error. In a logistic regression, an error was more likely to be labeled
as such if committed by a resident 25 and less likely to be called an
error if it was committed by an attending physician.
26
Moreover, a response was significantly more likely to be made to
the error if a resident committed it27 and significantly less likely if an
attending committed the error.28 Since residents present the informa-
tion about errors and their professional future is dependent on posi-
tive recommendations from attendings, it is logical that they will not
be harsh on the attendings for whom they work. In addition, an error
causing serious harm was significantly less likely to receive a re-
sponse,29 perhaps because of the interpersonal dynamics of not want-
ing to devastate a colleague or to raise issues of potential malpractice
liability. Moreover, information about errors was not used systemati-
cally to prevent future errors or to facilitate an institutional response
to a patient who had been harmed. This was particularly problematic
when the error had an administrative cause yet the health care provid-
ers made no response themselves and did not disclose it to administra-
tive staff for a response on their part.30 For example, the
administration was notified in only eight of the 185 administrative er-
rors and in only one of the thirty-four cases in which an error occurred
24. For only 8.67% of errors was an attending physician blamed. This was less than the pro-
portions for residents (15.02%) or nurses (12.51%).
25. (p = .0002, z score = 4.221).
26. (p = .00532, z score = (-2.787)). An adverse event was more likely to be called an error if
it was due to a commission rather than an omission (p = .0000, z score = 11.308), or if the case
was clear (p = .0000, z score = 7.157). Variables that were not significantly related to whether an
adverse event was labeled an error were demographic variables regarding the patient (race, gen-
der, payor status, age), the patient's condition (if the patient was in an ICU or the length of the
patient's stay), and whether the person who committed the act was a member of the identifier's
service.
27. (p = .00531, z score - 2.788).
28. (p = .01850, z score = (-2.355)). A response was also significantly more likely to be made
to the error when the cause was clear (p = .0017, z score = 3.760), and significantly less likely to
receive a response if the patient was older (p = .00855, z score = (-2.630)) or if the harm was
serious (p = .02430, z score = (-2.252)).
29. (p = .02430, z score = (-2.252)).




because necessary equipment was not available. No one notified the
administration in any of the forty-two cases in which an error occurred
due to defective equipment.
Whether blame was assigned was in part dependent on the outcome
of the error. Blame was most likely to be assigned in cases where
injury was averted by skill (100% of such cases), where there was
emotional injury only (80% of such cases), where there was no injury(68.8% of such cases), and where there was physical injury of short
duration (60.7% of such cases). It was less likely to be assigned when
injury was averted by luck (46.7% of such cases) or where the injury
was serious (49.1% of such cases). Thus, blame was assigned a higher
percentage of the time when the consequences of assigning blame
were not great (because the patient had not been seriously injured and
thus was less likely to litigate) or when the incident could be used to
discuss the health care provider's skill.
The study points to several flaws in the current mechanisms of self-
regulation of physicians. The morbidity and mortality meetings and
other clinical meetings are the only places outside of the legal system
where high-ranking physicians are held accountable for their errors.
However, in those settings, blame was not commonly assigned to the
highest ranking physicians and blame was less frequently assigned for
errors which cause serious injury than for errors which cause no injury
or minor injury. In addition, information about errors discussed in
those settings was not used systematically to prevent future errors or
to facilitate an institutional response to a patient who had been
harmed.
The findings of the observational study suggest that the self-regula-
tory system of rounds and clinical meetings is an excellent way of
identifying a wide range of errors. However, it is not an efficient way
of preventing future errors or calling to task the highest-status health
care providers. When health care providers in these settings discussed
potential responses, only 1% of those responses entailed decisions to
inform the hospital administration about the occurrence of the errors.
E. Occurrence Reports and Potential Claims
Because hospitals do not currently have procedures for monitoring
the discussions of errors at rounds and clinical meetings, they use
other mechanisms-occurrence reports and potential claims files-for
encouraging the reporting of error to the hospital itself. An analysis
of the occurrence reports filed in the hospital during the time period
of the observational study found that they did not adequately capture
the range and number of errors which were discussed at meetings. In
[Vol. 54:357
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the observational study, there were 480 patients who had errors dis-
cussed at meetings, yet only 113 of the patients in the study population
had occurrence reports filed about them.
Within the hospital system, error reporting was discouraged in vari-
ous ways. At orientation, new medical residents were actually told by
more senior doctors not to fill out occurrence reports. Consequently,
the error-reporting through occurrence reports was generally under-
taken by nurses and generally focused on the most mundane errors.
The greatest proportion of errors chronicled in the occurrence reports
overall involved medications and complications. The occurrence re-
ports had a significantly lower proportion of errors involving diagno-
sis, surgery, and treatment than did the discussions at rounds and
meetings. 31 Moreover, the occurrence reports did not provide an ef-
fective early warning system about claims. When hospital-wide data
for a two-year period was analyzed, only 13.49% of the patients who
brought claims had an occurrence report filed about them.
The potential claims files (in contrast to the occurrence reports) did
a better job of capturing problems in diagnosis, surgery, and treat-
ment, although they still focused on significantly different categories
of errors than did the clinical discussions. 32 Moreover, the potential
claims files also dramatically underreported the full range of serious
errors discussed at rounds and meetings. Of the 480 patients who
were reported to have had errors in their care, only twenty-two were
the subject of a potential claim file. In fact, more than half of the
people with serious errors (121 of 185, or 65.4%) that were discussed
at rounds or meetings were not brought to the attention of the hospi-
tal through either of the existing mechanisms (occurrence reports or
potential claim files). 33
The bulk of information about errors in patient care is not passed
on to the hospital administration through these institutional channels
of occurrence reports and potential claim files. This impedes the hos-
pital's ability to recognize the incidence and nature of errors and de-
velop preventive strategies.
31. The difference in the sums of these three types of errors across the two forms of reporting
reported is significant at the p < .00001 level. They form 19.1% and 7.3% of these groups,
respectively.
32. P < .0001.
33. Figure 4 compares the percentage of patients with errors of different types that came to
the hospital's attention through the various mechanisms. See infra app. A, fig. 4.
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V. CLAIMS BY PATIENTS
Hospitals also identify errors by patient claims. If there were a pa-
tient complaint or a claim for damages for every error that occurred,
hospitals could use these patient responses to identify errors. How-
ever, far fewer patients make complaints, file claims, or otherwise ex-
press dissatisfaction with care than the number who could.
Although 45.8% of the 1047 patients in the study experienced atleast one error, and at least 17.7% of patients had one or more errors
with a serious injury, far fewer patients took any actions that indicated
dissatisfaction with their care. Of the 1047 patients in the study,
thirty-nine patients (3.7%) asked that their medical records be sent to
themselves, to another health care provider or to a lawyer-a possible
indicator of dissatisfaction. Five patients (less than half of 1%) sent
letters of complaint to the president of the hospital. Thirteen patients
of the 1047 (1.2%) brought a claim.34
Looking more closely at the 185 people who were victims of errors
with serious effects, only a few took any actions that indicated dissatis-
faction. Eight (4.3%) made a records request, one wrote a letter of
complaint (0.5%), and four (2.2%) made claims. Of the patients iden-
tified by health care workers as having errors with serious effects,
62.7% (116 of 185) were not brought to the hospital's attention either
through the formal hospital channels of occurrence reports or poten-
tial claims, or through patient-initiated contacts.
With only thirteen of the 1047 patients bringing claims, we could
not do much in the way of statistical analyses to determine how claim-
ers differed from non-claimers. 35 To learn more about claiming, we
turned to additional data sources covering all patients who have been
admitted to the hospital over a two-year period. During that period,
there were an additional 450 files opened by the hospital as potential
claims and there were fifty-four claims. These potential claims, the
34. Figure 5 shows how few of the 13 patients came to the hospital's attention prior to claim-ing. For purposes of this study, a claim was defined as a demand for compensation or remedia-
tion of a perceived error. See infra app. A, fig. 5. Figure 5 also indicates which of the 13 patients
eluded all the hospital's methods of discovery prior to their claim (Patient Number One) and
which patients were identified through multiple means (such as Patient Number Six).
35. We can tell you a little about the eleven patients who claimed. In each case:(1) There was an event that appeared to be clear error.(2) Either the patient or the patient's family (or both) had evidence that some aspects of thepatient's care had been badly handled (though it was not necessarily the incident at issue in the
claim).
(3) Prior to the claim, the patient or family was noted to be aroused in some way about the care
(angry or depressed).
There was external evidence that provided support for any negative inferences the claimants
might draw (for example, a remark by a physician about a problem in the care).
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majority of which were initiated by calls from physicians, involved in-
cidents about which the health care provider felt that the patient had a
right to sue. Overall, only about one in nine patients that the hospital
suggested in its internal files had a right to sue actually came forward
and sued.
What distinguished the claimers from the non-claimers? A funda-
mental characteristic of the patient that seems intuitively related to
the decision to claim is whether the patient was aware of the negli-
gence. Patients are not routinely told when errors have been commit-
ted in their care. 36 Naturally, all the claimers were aware of their
errors, significantly more than the 70% of patients who were the sub-
ject of potential claims files.37 Significantly fewer of the patients iden-
tified in potential claim files-46%-learned of the error by
witnessing it. The claimers also had more serious injuries than the
nonclaimers (although 56% of the nonclaimers had serious injuries,
including 33% who died).
Certain background characteristics of the patients were correlated
with claiming. White patients and wealthier patients were more likely
to bring claims. However, gender of the patient did not seem to affect
whether a patient was likely to bring suit.
Surprisingly, the nature of the patient's relationship with his or her
physician-that is, whether the relationship was good or bad-was not
correlated with claiming. However, if a patient or a patient's family
was dissatisfied with the overall care, that patient was more likely to
make a claim. Further, 51% of the patients in the potential files were
dissatisfied, as compared to 89% of the claimants.
The status of the health care provider was also correlated with
claiming. There was a greater tendency for potentials to turn into
claims when the incidents involved lower status health care profes-
sionals. For example, there was a higher proportion of errors involv-
ing nurses in the claims than in the potentials.
Because so few claims are brought by patients compared to the ac-
tual number of errors, an assessment of patient claims is not the most
effective method for a hospital to assess its quality of care. The ex-
isting formal hospital mechanisms for bringing problems in patient
care to the attention of the hospital administration-the incident re-
ports and the potential claims files-were also deficient.
36. See, e.g., Albert W. Wu et al., Do House Officers Learn from Their Mistakes?, 265 JAMA
2089-94 (1991).
37. It is also interesting to look at how patients learned of the error. A majority of all pa-
tients, 57%, learned of the error by witnessing it themselves, while another quarter learned
about it from a health care provider, usually their physician.
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VI. LIMITATIONS TO THE ERROR IDENTIFICATION IN WORK
IDENTIFICATION IN WORK ROUNDS AND
CLINICAL MEETINGS
Although the discussions at work rounds and clinical meetings cap-
tured many more errors than the institutional reporting mechanisms
of occurrence files, potential claim files, or lawsuits, they did not cap-
ture all of the errors that occurred in patient care. The observers
heard no errors mentioned with respect to 567 (54.2%) of the 1047
patients in the study units. Of these 567 patients, fifty-one were iden-
tified in occurrence reports; three were considered by the hospital tobe potential claimants; four asked that copies of their records be sent
to other doctors or to lawyers; two wrote letters complaining about
their care; and two instituted claims. Of the two patients who claimed
and had not been discussed at the meetings, one had not come to the
attention of the hospital through any of the other channels (occur-
rence report, potential claim file, complaint letter, or medical records
request). The other had been the subject of an occurrence report.
Overall, however, patients about whom errors were mentioned at
the work rounds and clinical meetings appeared significantly more
often in occurrence reports and potential claims than did patients for
whom no errors were discussed. 38 Similarly, patients identified at
rounds and in meetings as having errors were significantly more likely
to bring claims.39
VII. POLICY RESPONSES TO MEDICAL ERRORS
This study found that a high percentage of hospitalized surgical pa-
tients had errors in their care. However, the vast majority of patients
with errors (345 of 480) were not brought to the attention of the hos-pital as an institution, either by the health care providers or by pa-
tients. This impeded efforts to prevent future errors. Moreover, since
the health care providers and the institution received additional reve-
nues for their efforts in correcting the errors they made (generally
without the patients realizing that errors had been made), there waslittle economic pressure to correct the errors. The slim possibility ofhaving to pay compensation to a patient did not appear to provide a
sufficient incentive to avoid errors, since only 1.24% of patients (thir-
teen of 1047) made a claim and most people making claims did not
receive compensation. Of the twenty-six patients who were classified
as potential claims by the hospital itself, most did not claim. Yet, the
38. p < .00001 (z score = 7.53).
39. p < .005 (z score = 2.82).
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hospital set aside substantial reserves-generally about $100,000 per
patient-to compensate those patients if they had made claims.
By four years after the end of the statute of limitations period, only
three of the thirteen claiming patients had received compensation;
two had cases which were still pending.40 The hospital set aside
$4,700,000 as a potential payout to the thirteen patients. They had set
aside a million total for the three who ultimately received $335,000
total.41 There were voluntary dismissals of a number of cases, which
had $100,000 set aside each. Subsequently, the two additional pa-
tients' cases were resolved, one by dismissal and one by a substantial
settlement.
What legal policies might be appropriate to increase the amount of
attention hospitals pay to errors in care and to create incentives for
hospitals to prevent errors? The potential policies include creating a
duty to disclose error on the part of the erring physician or his or her
colleagues, expanding the circumstances under which hospitals are lia-
ble for physicians' actions, or substituting enterprise liability on the
part of hospitals for physicians' malpractice liability.
A. The Erring Health Care Provider's Duty to Disclose
One approach with a solid grounding in existing law would be to
impose upon health care providers a duty to inform patients that er-
rors have occurred in their care. This would presumably put greater
pressure on health care providers and hospitals to monitor how care is
provided. Such a disclosure duty might be handled under the legal
concept of informed consent or as a part of the physician's fiduciary
duty to the patient, since fiduciaries generally have a duty to disclose
40. Eight had voluntarily dismissed their cases.
41. Even if the three cases totaling $335,000 had been handled on a contingent fee basis of a
generous one-third, the maximum paid to the thirteen plaintiffs' attorneys would have been
$111,666.66. In contrast, the defense attorneys handling the thirteen cases received $388,664.19.
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information relevant to the client's interests.42 Not disclosing an error
could also be considered fraudulent concealment. 43
A duty to disclose would certainly seem warranted where the error
has created an additional problem that the patient will need cor-
rected.44 A duty to disclose an error when rectifying treatment is
42. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 738-39 (5th ed. 1984). See also Farmer's State Bank of
Newport v. Lamon, 231 P. 952, 953 (Wash. 1925). In Wohligemuth v. Meyer, 293 P.2d 816 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1956), the court noted that there existed a fiduciary duty on the part of the doctor and
on the part of the hospital to disclose negligence: "The doctor-patient relationship is a fiduciary
one and it is incumbent on the doctor to reveal all pertinent information to his patient. The
same is true of the hospital-patient relationship .... Withholding information [that negligence
had caused the death of the plaintiff's wife] would in a sense amount to misrepresentation." Id.
at 820.
Moreover, in Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980), the court, in reversing a directed
verdict in favor of the defendants and remanding for a new trial, held that "once the duty to
disclose certain information is established, then the physician's total breach of that duty, as
found in the present case [where the doctor could not locate a surgical needle after it became
disengaged from the needleholder during surgery and did not disclose the presence of the needle
to the patient], presents to the jury the question of what damages were proximately caused by
the breach." Id. at 354-55 (footnotes omitted). The court reasoned that the fiduciary nature of
the physician-patient relationship, combined with the patient's right to determine what shall or
shall not be done with his body, created a duty in the physician to disclose to his patient any
material information concerning the patient's physical condition. Id. at 354. The court stated
that the information was material and disclosure was required if a reasonable person in the
patient-plaintiff's position would have considered the information important in choosing a
course of treatment. Id.
In Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. 1983), "during the operation, a suture needle broke
and Dr. Peck purposely left a portion of the needle in Borderlon's abdominal region." Id. at 908.
Dr. Peck did not inform the patient of the needle, but another doctor discovered the needle a
month later at which point Borderlon underwent another surgery to remove the needle from his
abdomen. Id. Although Borderlon brought suit after the statute of limitations elapsed, the
court held that there is a duty for the physician to disclose negligent acts or injuries which occur
from treatment. Id. The court stated that "[blecause the physician-patient relationship is one of
trust and confidence, Texas recognizes a duty on the part of the physician to disclose a negligent
act or fact that an injury has occurred." Id. This concept was reinforced in Earle v. Ratliff, 998
S.W.2d 882, 888 (Tex. 1999) (affirming the physician's duty to disclose a negligent act and hold-
ing that "fraudulent concealment requires more than evidence that the physician failed to use
ordinary care; it also requires evidence that the defendant actually knew the plaintiff was in fact
wronged, and concealed that fact to deceive the plaintiff").
43. A California court of appeals found fraudulent concealment when a professional football
player suffered a knee injury in a game and the team physician failed to reveal to him that the
injury was degenerative and that continued professional play would only worsen the condition.
See Krueger v. S.F. Forty-Niners, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579, 585 (Ct. App. 1987). The player continued
to play football, received additional treatments from the physician, and thereby suffered irre-
versible knee damage. Id. at 580-82.
44. In Nixdorf, the court concluded that the "[djamages which may be shown to follow as a
proximate result of the nondisclosure include reasonable charges for discovery and removal of
the needle and monetary compensation for the mental anguish following the realization of the
needle's presence." Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 355.
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needed 45 could be justified under the informed consent line of cases
that require physicians to inform patients about the nature of their
condition. 46 An Illinois case, Taber v. Riordan,47 suggested that just as
there is a pre-operative duty to inform of possible complications, there
might be a post-operative duty to inform of complications that have
arisen. Such a duty can also be analogized to the cases in which a
physician has a duty to warn of subsequently-discovered risks of a
treatment, such as the cases which require physicians to contact pa-
tients and former patients to warn them of the subsequently-discov-
ered risks of certain intrauterine devices.
48
Beyond situations in which non-disclosure of error might put pa-
tients at physical risk, there are many situations in which the non-dis-
closure would put patients at future financial risk. With respect to
43% of the errors identified in the observational study, the health care
providers took subsequent medical action to correct the error (such as
returning the patient to surgery or instituting antibiotics). Presuma-
bly, in many instances, the patient was not told that there was an error
in care, but was led to believe that the subsequent treatment was ne-
cessitated by his or her original condition. Yet the patient was gener-
ally billed for the subsequent treatment. One study estimated that the
in-hospital costs for a drug error on a hospitalized patient averaged
$6,341. 49 In our prospective observational study, only a small minority
of bills were forgiven. Of the patients in the observational study for
whom potential claims were started, certain charges were forgiven for
5%. Of the patients who brought claims, certain charges were for-
given for 23%.
Requiring disclosure to prevent financial harm is akin to numerous
other precedents that prohibit physicians from taking unfair financial
advantage of patients. These include statutes that require physicians
to disclose when they are referring patients to laboratories or nursing
homes in which they have a financial interest. 50 Further, other cir-
45. In some instances, the physician's failure to reveal the error has meant the patient was
denied the chance to get a corrective treatment in time. See, e.g., Simcuski v. Saeli, 377 N.E.2d
713 (N.Y. 1978).
46. See, e.g., Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919. 9'2-23 (Wash. 1979).
47. 403 N.E.2d 1349 (Il1. App. Ct. 1980).
48. See, e.g., Tresemer v. Barke, 86 Cal. App. 3d 656 (1978). See also Reyes v. Anka Research.
Ltd., 443 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Misc. 1981).
49. See David W. Bates et al., The Costs of Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients. 277
JAMA 307 (1997).
50. Similarly, some statutes governing disciplinary actions against physicians prohibit
"[p]romotion of the sale of drugs, devices, appliances, or goods provided for a patient in such




cumstances require a duty to disclose as illustrated in Moore v. Re-
gents of the University of California,51 where physicians were found to
have a fiduciary duty to disclose to a patient the commercial interest
they had in developing a cell line out of the patient's tissue. 52 These
various precedents suggest a sensitivity to potential conflicts of inter-
est, which is also a guiding force behind the larger informed consent
doctrine itself.5 3 To the extent that non-disclosure of negligently
caused errors allows health care providers to avoid the lawsuits that
might require them to pay patients, errors create a conflict of interest
between physicians and patients that should be disclosed.
The problem of non-disclosure of error has been acknowledged, to
some extent, in cases that toll the statute of limitations regarding mal-
practice where the physician conceals the error from the patient.54 In
such cases, non-disclosure is viewed as misrepresentation 55 or fraud.56
While most cases deal with physicians who have actively misled the
patient, 57 others adopt the stance that silence about an error can con-
stitute constructive fraud. For example, in Koppes v. Pearson,58 a 1986
Iowa decision concerning a surgeon who allegedly negligently failed to
remove all of a herniated disc from the plaintiff's back during surgery,
the court recognized that ordinarily the party relying on the fraudu-
51. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
52. Id.
53. See generally, e.g., Theodore J. Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Dangers of Bias in the
Formation of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 124.
54. See, e.g., Bowman v. McPheeters, 176 P.2d 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947); Lopez v. Swyer, 279
A.2d 116 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1971), modified, 300 A.2d 563 (N.J. 1973). In addition, some
state statutes of limitations are tolled if a tortfeasor conceals a potential cause of action from a
victim. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 859 (West Supp. 2003) stating:
[l]f a person, liable to any action mentioned, fraudulently conceals the cause thereof
from the person entitled thereto, or if a fraud is committed which entitles any person to
an action, the action may be commenced at any time within 6 years after the person
entitled thereto discovers that he has just cause of action....
Id.
55. The Lopez court stated:
We hold that the relationship between a doctor and his patient is of such a confidential
and vital nature that an affirmative duty requiring the doctor to disclose to his patient
fully the facts of the medical case does exist and that silence in this regard may be
sufficient to infer a constructive misrepresentation.
Lopez, 279 A.2d at 124.
56. Morrison v. Acton, 198 P.2d 590, 595 (Ariz. 1948); Simcuski v. Saeli, 377 N.E.2d 713, 718(N.Y. 1978). The court in Schmucking v. Mayo, 235 N.W. 633 (Minn. 1931), noted that within a
fiduciary and confidential relationship, fraud might be more readily perpetuated. See also Rob-
erts v. Francis, 128 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 1997); Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1991);
Mangoni v. Temkin, 679 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Saffold v. Scarborough, 86 S.E.2d
649 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955); Hawks v. DeHart, 146 S.E.2d 187 (Va. 1966).
57. Simcuski, 377 N.E.2d at 718.
58. 384 N.W.2d 381, 382 (Iowa 1986).
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lent concealment to avoid a statute of limitations defense must show
that the defendant affirmatively concealed facts from the plaintiff on
which the plaintiff would predicate its cause of action. 59 The court
explained, however, that where a confidential or fiduciary relationship
exists, the requirement of affirmative acts of concealment may be re-
laxed.60 The court further explained that the physician-patient rela-
tionship, because it is one of trust and confidence, "gave rise to duties
of disclosure which may obviate the need for a patient to prove an
affirmative act of concealment."
'6
'
Physicians might be more inclined to disclose error if they realized
that such action will not necessarily lead to a lawsuit. The Veterans
Affairs (VA) Hospitals adopted a mandatory error disclosure ap-
proach to patients which has met with great success. In Lexington,
Kentucky, the VA Medical Center began a policy of full error disclo-
sure to patients in 1987.62 Rather than observing a spike in litigation
and lawsuits, the VA hospital has actually realized savings with regard
to legal expenses because of a greater number of settlements.63 The
program appears "to have maximized only the number of patients
who are justly compensated for injuries" rather than increasing the
number of lawsuits. 64
Nondisclosure can lead to a patient's lack of trust in a physician,
which itself might provoke litigation. A recent study found that 77%
of doctors thought "physicians should be required to tell patients
when errors are made in their care;"' 65 and 89% of patients agreed that
doctors should be required to disclose medical error.66 However, an-
other study found that patients overwhelmingly wanted almost all er-
59. Id. at 386.
60. Id.
61. Id. Interestingly, the Indiana courts have simultaneously narrowed and enlarged the doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment. While Indiana courts subscribe to the principle that silence is
enough where a fiduciary relationship exists, these courts also conclude that when the relation-
ship is terminated, the duty to inform is also terminated and the concealment ceases to exist.
GYN-OB Consultants v. Schopp, 780 N.E.2d 1206. 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). See also Umolu v.
Rosolik. 666 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Carrow v. Streeter, 410 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1989).
62. Albert W. Wu, Handling Hospital Errors: Is Disclosure the Best Defense? 131 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 970, 971 (1999). In 1995, the Department of Veterans Affairs included in its
policy manual that error disclosure is mandatory. See Steve S. Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk
Management: Extreme Honesty May Be the Best Policy, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 963, 964
(1999).
63. Kraman & Hamm, supra note 62, at 964-67; Wu, supra note 62, at 971.
64. Wu, supra note 62, at 971.
65. Robert J. Blendon et al., Views of Practicing Physicians and the Public on Medical Errors,




rors disclosed, while physicians preferred to tell patients about minor
medical errors, such as an incorrect insulin dosage, yet would "spin"
their statements to reduce the potential negative connotation and
might even withhold some details regarding the incident.67 Patients,
on the other hand, wanted extensive information and many times felt
as though something was gravely wrong with them due to the lack of
information and felt that the lack of disclosure inhibited the trust rela-
tionship between the patient and physician.68 Physicians feared that
disclosure would lead to litigation when it came to more serious errors
and were much less likely to disclose information. 69 A commentary
about the study asserts that doctors must understand that often pa-
tients are seeking information solely for medical purposes from their
doctors rather than for litigation purposes; therefore, error disclosure
to the patient should become common practice to improve patient-
physician relationships and reduce future medical error. 70
B. Other Health Care Providers' Duty to Disclose
A more expansive policy would require not only that the erring
physician disclose his or her errors, but also that other health care
providers who witness the error or its effects disclose as well.71 The
policy reasons for such a disclosure are the same as for requiring dis-
closure on the part of the primary physician: to prevent physical and/
or financial harm to the patient.72
Some cases resulted in liability for secondary treating physicians for
failure to disclose that the patient's health problem was caused by the
67. Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients' and Physicians' Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure of
Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001, 1004 (2003).
68. Id. at 1005.
69. Id. at 1004-05.
70. Id. at 1006.
71. See Joan Vogel & Richard Delgado, To Tell the Truth: Physicians' Duty to Disclose Medi-
cal Mistakes, 28 UCLA L. REV. 52, 57 (1980). The authors argue that such a duty to disclose
would allow more patients to bring malpractice suits and would create "pressure on governmen-
tal agencies and medical societies to take effective action to reduce the incidence of malpractice.
Spurred by the increased number of cases likely to be brought and their attendant publicity,
existing regulatory mechanisms would gain new life." Id. at 61.
72. There are a series of cases in which physicians have been held to have a duty to assist
patients in litigation. Such cases have involved situations in which, for example, the physician
negligently understated a patient's injuries to a court, an adversary in litigation, or an insurer,
thus causing the patient to receive a smaller settlement than he or she deserved. See, e.g., Brous-
seau v. Jarrett, 73 Cal. App. 3d 864 (1977) (allowing the plaintiff to proceed with his action for
negligent misrepresentation of injuries to insurance company); Rosenthal v. Blum, 529 S.W.2d
102, 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (holding that plaintiff stated a cause of action for negligent mis-
representation of injuries to patient who was in the course of negotiating a settlement with an
insurance company). See also Alexander v. Knight, 177 A.2d 142, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962)(affirming the granting of a new trial regarding physician's duty to aid the patient in litigation).
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error of a previous physician. However, these cases have generally
dealt with situations in which the subsequent physicians actively mis-
led the patient.73
Physicians who reveal the malpractice of their colleagues or testify
against other physicians risk being boycotted and losing their malprac-
tice insurance. 74 In our study, some surgeons identified errors made
by internists, but did not report those errors back to them because the
surgeons were concerned that the internists would stop making refer-
rals to the surgeons if their care was criticized. Registered nurses and
other types of medical support staff, such as phlebotomists and pri-
mary care technicians are in a good position to witness and report
medical error, but there is a strong disincentive to report these
problems for fear of losing one's job. For an effective secondary duty
to disclose, it would be necessary to develop protections for health
care providers who, in good faith, report the errors of their colleague.
Analogous statutory protections have been developed for health care
providers who reveal a colleague's deficiencies to hospital quality as-
surance committees.7
5
C. Hospital Liability for Physicians' Errors Under
Agency Principles
Traditionally, physicians were considered self-sufficient in the field
of health care and hospitals were not held liable for their mistakes. A
peer review system was established that allowed doctors to review
73. See, e.g., Sperandio v. Clymer, 563 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. 1978). Courts have little difficulty
imposing liability on the witnessing health care provider where that health care provider has
affirmatively acted to conceal the error. See, e.g., Morrison v. Acton, 198 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1948);
Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Ky. 1952); Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. 1983).
For example, in Lopez v. Swyer, 279 A.2d 116, 119 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971), the plaintiff-
patient, following a radial mastectomy for breast cancer, was referred by her family physician to
a radiologist for a course of radiation therapy. Id. at 119. The plaintiff-patient made repeated
inquiries regarding her condition and was repeatedly falsely reassured by both the radiologist
and family physician. Id. at 120. Approximately five years after radiation therapy, the plaintiff-
patient learned that her injuries were probably the result of the radiologists' negligence. Id. at
121. The plaintiff-patient brought suit alleging negligence, fraud, and conspiracy against her
family physician, his associates, and the radiologist. Id. at 120. The court not only found that
there was sufficient proof to uphold the plaintiff-patient's fraud claim against the witnessing
physician (because of the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship) but also held
that there was sufficient proof to uphold the independent conspiracy claim. Id. at 124-25.
74. Vogel & Delgado, supra note 71, at 60.
75. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT 60/5 (1988) (granting immunity from civil liability for peer review
and quality assurance activities unless those activities involve willful or wanton misconduct).
Similarly, an Illinois statute grants immunity from prosecution and from civil liability to those
people who make good faith reports to the Medical Disciplinary Board. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
60/23 (1997).
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other physicians, thereby excluding laymen from determining the cre-
dentials and competence of the physicians. Courts upheld this system
for many years.
One way to encourage greater efforts to prevent errors is to put
greater pressure on health care institutions (in addition to individual
providers) to identify and deal with errors.76 This could be done by
making the hospital liable under agency principles for physicians' er-
rors. Agency liability might lead hospitals to establish mechanisms to
make greater use of the information about errors identified in rounds
and clinical meetings. In the prospective observational study, less
than 1% of errors identified stimulated actions to prevent future
errors.
At present the general legal rule is that hospitals are liable for their
employees' actions, but not for those of attending physicians, who are
considered to be independent contractors. 77 However, if the hospital
has made it appear that a particular physician is its agent, the hospital
can be held liable. At least twenty-two states hold that agency princi-
76. A variety of cases have begun to hold hospitals liable, under various theories, even where
the physicians were independent contractors. See, e.g., Fletcher v. S. Peninsula Hosp., 71 P.3d
833, 838 (Alaska 2003) (allowing the plaintiff's action against the hospital to proceed under a
theory of corporate negligence); Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (af-
firming the judgment against the hospital for negligence in not acting upon two previous in-
stances of claimed malpractice by the same, independent contract, staff surgeon); Shands
Teaching Hosp. & Clinic, Inc v. Juliana. 863 So. 2d 343. 347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming
a finding of a breach of duty arising from the contract between the hospital and its patients,
notwithstanding the independent contractor status of the negligent hospital employee); Darling
v. Charleston Cmty. Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Il. 1965) (affirming a jury's finding of negligent
hospital treatment where plaintiff lost part of his leg from lack of circulation in the cast that the
doctor applied and the nurses failed to properly check); Arrington v. Galem-Med Inc., 838 So.
2d 895, 899 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming a judgment against the hospital where the hospital
had the right to control and supervise, as well as apparent authority over, the independent con-
tractor doctor); Butler v. Domin, 15 P.3d 1189, 1197 (Mont. 2000) (allowing the plaintiff's action
against the hospital to proceed because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the hospital intentionally or negligently led the plaintiff to believe that one of the doctors was its
agent); Clark v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, No. 78854, 2001 WL 995104 (Ohio. Ct. App. Aug. 30.
2001) (upholding as proper the trial court's instruction to the jury that the hospital could be held
liable under the doctrine of agency by estoppel for the negligence of independent medical practi-
tioners practicing in the hospital); Jennison v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 25 P.3d 358 (Or.
Ct. App. 2001) (affirming hospital's liability under an apparent agency theory): Thompson v.
Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991) (allowing the plaintiff's action against the hospital to
proceed because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the hospital provided
negligent supervision of the patient's medical care); Moser v. Heistand, 681 A.2d 1322 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that sovereign immunity precluded an action against the defendant
based on corporate liability); Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1980) (remanding for a new trial and allowing an action against the hospital under a theory
of ostensible agency).
77. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 413-14
(5th ed. 2001).
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pies can be used to hold hospitals liable. 78 For example, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania noted that when an independent physician ap-
pears to be held out as a hospital employee, it is reasonable for the
patient to assume that the physician is an employee of the hospital:
79
[A] patient today frequently enters the hospital seeking a wide
range of hospital services rather than personal treatment by a par-
ticular physician. It would be absurd to require such a patient to be
familiar with the law of respondeat superior and so to inquire as to
each person who treated him whether he is an employee of the hos-
pital or an independent contractor.80
Patients are likely to be unaware of the existence of a contractual rela-
tionship that exists between a doctor and a hospital and it is unreason-
able to expect knowledge of such. Some states recognizing hospital
liability under agency principles, though, require that the patient
demonstrate that he or she detrimentally relied on the hospital's rep-
resentation of the physician as its agent. 81
D. Corporate Liability as Applied to Hospitals
Hospital liability for physicians' errors has also been established
under the doctrine of corporate liability. This doctrine encompasses a
direct duty on the part of hospitals to patients regarding the selection
of physicians and the monitoring of care. Hospitals have a duty to use
due care in the granting of hospital privileges to physicians. 82 There
may also be liability in some cases for retaining physicians in situa-
tions where the hospital knew or should have known that the physi-
cian was not competent. Arguably, this duty could be extended to
hold hospitals liable for not establishing more efficient mechanisms
for identifying errors or for using the information about errors that
has been identified in rounds and clinical meetings.
78. Helaine W. Heydemann et al., Medical Malpractice, in TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW
§§ 12.02[3], 12.24 (Michael G. Macdonald et al. eds., 2003). These states are Alaska, Arizona,
California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, Wis-
consin, and Wyoming.
79. Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994).
82. Corleto v. Shore Mem'l Hosp., 350 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (personal
liability of hospital board members for failing to properly accredit). See also Johnson v. Miseri-
cordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981). In one interesting case, the hospital was found
liable even though the patient had selected the physician herself months before the hospitaliza-
tion. In that case, however, the claim was that she selected him in part because he told her he
had staff privileges at the hospital. This was a particularly egregious case because the "physi-
cian" was actually a fugitive drug dealer merely posing as a physician. See generally Insinga v.
LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989).
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Such a direct liability would give hospitals an incentive to prevent
incompetent practice and otherwise ensure the quality of care pro-
vided at its institution. 3 The hospital may be able to identify and cor-
rect physicians' deficiencies before they cause serious harm to a
patient.84 Certainly an early warning system is preferable to waiting
for the rare event of a malpractice suit based on serious injury to a
patient as a means to evaluate physicians' care. And, as one Califor-
nia court has pointed out, "the competent selection and review of
medical staff is precisely the type of professional service a hospital is
licensed and expected to provide. '8 5
At least twenty-eight states have adopted some form of corporate
liability.8 6 The corporate liability of the hospital for selection and
monitoring of physicians has even been codified in some jurisdictions.
In Florida, for example, a statute provides that "[a]ll health care facili-
ties.., have a duty to assure comprehensive risk management and the
competence of their medical staff and personnel through careful selec-
tion and review, and are liable for a failure to exercise due care in
fulfilling these duties. '8 7
Hospitals also have a duty to adopt adequate rules-for example,
rules for the handling of medications88 or for the transmission of pa-
tient information.8 9 In one case, a radiologist's report of a possible
skull fracture was not transcribed for two days; in the meantime, the
patient died.90 The hospital was found liable for not having a system
in place of transcription so that radiology reports would go promptly
to the treating physician or, if that physician was not available, to the
hospital administration. 91
83. See, e.g., Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Ct. App. 1982).
84. Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984). See also Barry Furrow, The Changing Role
of the Law in Promoting Quality in Health Care: From Sanctioning Outlaws to Managing Out-
comes, 26 Hous. L. REV. 147, 179 (1989); Susan B. Koehn, Note, Hospital Corporate Liability:
An Effective Solution to Controlling Private Physician Incompetence, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 342,
377 (1979).
85. Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hosp., 260 Cal. Rptr. 886, 896 (Ct. App. 1989).
86. See Heydemann et al., supra note 78. The states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
87. FLA. STAT. ANN § 766.110 (West 1992).
88. See, e.g., Ball Mem'l Hosp. v. Freeman, 196 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. 1964); Habuda v. Trustees of
Rex Hosp., 164 S.E.2d 17 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968).
89. Keene v. Methodist Hosp., 324 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 235.
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E. Holding Hospitals Liable Instead of Physicians
The theories of ostensible or apparent agency and of corporate lia-
bility allow patients to hold hospitals jointly liable, in certain in-
stances, with physicians and other health care providers. But an
alternative would be to hold the hospital liable instead of the health
care provider when the health care provider commits malpractice.
This broader concept of enterprise liability, which was advocated in a
report of the American Law Institute (ALI), would make the hospital
liable for all negligent errors of physicians delivering services within
the institution.92
In other areas of society, liability is focused on the enterprise, not
individual actors within it. If a physician worked for a drug company
and committed negligence in the course of developing a drug, the drug
company could be sued. The ALI report points out that no one ex-
pects pilots to have to obtain their own insurance at a higher cost than
flight attendants, even though their activities pose more risks. 93 In-
stead, it is assumed that the airline will be liable, even with respect to
pilot errors.94
A system of enterprise liability would create incentives for hospitals
to better monitor and respond to problems in the delivery of health
care in their institutions. Moreover, by having the hospital, rather
than multiple malpractice insurance companies, handling the cases,
the hospital may begin to see patterns of errors and devise means for
systematic change.
Enterprise liability would also create a more equitable distribution
of insurance premiums. The reason that some practitioners in high-
risk practice fields such as neurosurgery have to pay such high premi-
ums despite a clean record95 is that the pool of such practitioners in
their geographic area is small. With this alternative approach, physi-
cians would not have to pay premiums since the hospitals themselves
92. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY VOL. I
AND II (1991) [hereinafter ALl REPORT]. This would change the picture considerably, since
"roughly three-quarters of all malpractice claims are now brought against physicians and other
individual providers." 2 ALI REPORT 115 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STUDY OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF CLOSED CLAIMS IN 1984, at 52-53 (1987)). The
hospital would only be responsible for accidental patient injuries, not intentional ones. Id. at
117.
93. Id. at 118 n.14.
94. Id.
95. See Neil Versel, High Malpractice Premiums Send Specialists Reeling, 6 MODERN PHYSI-
CIAN 24, 24 (2002).
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would self-insure or purchase insurance. The hospitals would be bet-
ter able to distribute the cost of that insurance. 96
Holding hospitals instead of physicians liable would also have some
advantages in terms of savings in litigating cases. With a single defen-
dant,97 the cost of litigation would be less and there would be less
delay due to finger-pointing, because each of the health care providers
involved in the care of a particular patient would no longer have an
incentive to blame the error on someone else.
Some policy changes would be necessary for such a system to oper-
ate fairly. Changes in pricing of medical services would need to be
considered so that doctors do not obtain a windfall. To the extent that
part of the current price of a physician's services is due to the cost of
the physician's malpractice insurance premiums, prices should be re-
duced. Hospital prices, on the other hand, should rise accordingly.
A change would also be necessary to ensure a mechanism for identi-
fying negligent physicians to the National Practitioner Data Bank
(Data Bank).98 Currently, physicians who are successfully sued by pa-
tients are listed in the Data Bank so that there is a central repository
for hospitals to turn to in the course of their decisions about whether
or not to grant staff privileges. If physicians are no longer named in
suits, there will need to be an alternative mechanism for providing
their names to the Data Bank.
The greatest policy change necessary if enterprise liability were
adopted would be the simultaneous abolishment of any immunity doc-
trines (such as charitable immunity or sovereign tort immunity). By
abolishing such immunity, certain patients who could have sued their
physicians but, under enterprise liability, only have recourse against
the hospital, would not be deprived of their cause of action because of
the hospital's immunity from suit.
When hospitals first came into existence, they were protected from
suit by the doctrine of charitable immunity. 99 The rationale for the
doctrine was that hospitals, as charitable institutions, were financed by
donations intended for funding fund health care rather than litigation.
96. The cost of malpractice insurance is approximately 1% of the total health care cost in this
country. Id. at 117.
97. About one quarter of claims have multiple defendants. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, supra note 3, at 28.
98. National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and Other
Health Care Practitioners, 45 C.F.R. § 60.2-60.14 (2003) (as authorized by 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11101-11152 (2000)).
99. This rule was in effect almost universally in the United States until the 1940s. See gener-
ally Arthur F. Southwick, Hospital Liability: Two Theories Have Been Merged, 4 J. LEG. MED. 1
(1983).
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The chipping away at the charitable immunity doctrine began once
insurance became available to hospitals. While liability insurance was
virtually unknown in the nineteenth century, 00 risk spreading through
insurance is now seen as part of the normal cost of doing business.
Charitable immunity was curtailed in cases where hospitals were
held liable for what were considered to be "administrative acts." At
the same time, the institutions were not held liable for "professional
acts."' 01 In twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia, charita-
ble immunity has been abolished. 10 2
Another immunity doctrine that would need to be abolished if en-
terprise liability were adopted is sovereign tort immunity. Under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, the federal and state governments are
not liable for the tortious acts of their employees. 10 3 The doctrine of
governmental immunity provides a similar immunity to local govern-
mental units.10 4
Despite trends to abolish sovereign immunity in other institutional
settings, there is still substantive immunity for hospitals operated by
governmental units. A number of states provide local governmental
100. Bradley C. Canon & Dean Jaros, The Impact of Changes in Judicial Doctrine: The Abro-
gation of Charitable Immunity, 13 LAW & Soc'y REV. 969, 974 (1979).
101. Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 4-5 (N.Y. 1957).
102. See generally Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Tort Immunity of Nongovernmental Charities -
Modern Status, 25 A.L.R. 4th 517 (1983).
103. At common law, the immunity acted more to deny jurisdiction in the King's courts than
to deny relief completely. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 458 n.1 (Cal. 1961)
(superceded by statute). There was, however, jurisdiction for equitable relief in the court of
Exchequer. Id. Thus, the doctrine allowed substantial relief and did not produce the harsh
results which occur today. Id. at 458. That this doctrine became the basis for a rule that federal
and state governments in the United States did not have to answer for their torts and the torts of
their employees has been called "'one of the mysteries of legal evolution."' Id. at 459 (quoting
Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924)).
The Illinois Supreme Court remarked "that in preserving the sovereign immunity theory,
courts have overlooked the fact that the Revolutionary War was fought to abolish that 'divine
right of kings' on which the theory is based." Molitor v. Kaneland Comm. Unit Dist. No. 302,
163 N.E.2d 89, 94 (I11. 1959).
104. The doctrine of immunity for local governmental units originated in the English case of
Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). This tort action against an unincorporated
county was disallowed on two grounds: first, since the county was unincorporated, there was no
fund out of which the judgment could be paid; and second, the court concluded as a matter of
policy that "it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should
suffer an inconvenience." Muskopf, 359 P.2d at 459 (citing Russell, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362). The
Russell rule, first brought to the United States by Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247
(1812), became the general American rule. Muskopf, 359 P.2d at 459. The Massachusetts court
adopted the Russell rule despite the fact that the county was incorporated, could sue and be
sued, and possessed a corporate fund out of which a judgment could be satisfied. Id. at 459
(citing Mower, 9 Mass. at 249).
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units with immunity for the operation and maintenance of hospitals. t0 5
Moreover, for those states that do not specifically protect hospital op-
erations, hospital operations are generally characterized as discretion-
ary106 or governmental 10 7 functions thereby protected by immunity. 10 8
In addition to these approaches, one state (Texas) predicates liability
on the "condition or use of tangible personal or real property." 10 9
The effects of the legal doctrines on patients' right to sue can be
illustrated by applying the various legal theories to the incidents in the
observational study. 110 Reflecting back on the data from the prospec-
tive observational study, there were 332 patients who suffered errors
due to the actions of an identifiable health care provider or hospital
employee.111 Under independent contractor theory, 92% of those pa-
tients would clearly be able to sue, while the 8% whose errors were
attributable to an attending physician would not be able to sue the
hospital. Moreover, some of the 92% also suffered errors due to at-
tendings' actions. These errors might have been more harmful, but
the patient would only be allowed to sue from the harm of the em-
ployees' actions, not the attending's actions.
If a broad charitable immunity covered the hospital, no patients
would be allowed to sue the hospital. If a more limited charitable
immunity were in place, distinguishing between administrative and
professional acts, 1.5% of the patients who were victims of error in the
prospective observational study would have a right to sue. 112
Similarly, if a broad sovereign or governmental immunity were in
place, no patients would be allowed to sue the hospital. If the more
limited Texas model were in place, only 15% of the patients in the
observational study would be able to bring suit to redress their inju-
105. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.03(11) (2001) (immunity for treatment at a municipal
hospital where "reasonable use of available funds has been made to provide care").
106. See, e.g., Canon v. Thumudo, 422 N.W.2d 688, 699 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) ("'there seems
to be little doubt that medical decision-making is inherently discretionary"' (quoting Fuhrmann
v. Hattaway, 311 N.W.2d 379 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981))).
107. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees, 843 S.W.2d 353, 359 (Mo. 1992) (stating that "the
operation of a hospital by a city has traditionally been held to be governmental").
108. Twenty-two states still have some form of government immunity for government hospi-
tals. E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Immunity from Liability for Damages in Tort of State or Gov-
ernmental Unit or Agency in Operating Hospital, 25 A.L.R. 2d 203 (1997).
109. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (1997).
110. See infra app. A, fig. 6.
111. A total of 480 patients suffered errors. However, data is available about the identity and
position of the person causing the error for only 332 patients.
112. Eighty-five percent would not have a right to sue. The remaining 13.6% suffered errors
caused by administrative acts and professional acts. Thus, their ability to bring suit would de-
pend on which errors were linked to the patient's injuries.
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ries.11 3 This foreclosure is a consequence of the Texas state legisla-
ture's decision to predicate liability on the involvement of tangible
property.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Hospitals are high-risk institutions, with nearly half of surgical pa-
tients falling victim to errors in their care. The mechanisms for re-
sponding to errors tend to focus on the errors caused by individuals
rather than those caused by the institution and are deficient in terms
of preventing errors.
The formal monitoring systems in place to bring errors to the atten-
tion of the hospital (through occurrence reports and potential claim
files) did not capture all of the serious errors identified in the rounds
and meetings. Moreover, the occurrence reports failed to capture er-
rors that occurred at the key junctures of diagnosis and surgery.
The types of errors that could be reported on an occurrence report
form-and thus be monitored in written form-were not necessarily
the ones with the most serious consequences for patients or even the
most potential for litigation. For example, 91% of the errors reported
on those forms involved no injury to the patient.
The hospital under study had a committee in place, the Patient
Safety Committee, to deal with issues of quality where future harm to
patients could be prevented. The institution also had various risk
management activities. However, information about problems in care
identified at clinical meetings was rarely transmitted to the entities
charged with patient safety or risk management.
Health care providers candidly discuss errors in patient care at work
rounds and clinical meetings. Such discussions are viewed as crucial
to a teaching hospital's joint missions of providing patient care and
training physicians and nurses. The willingness to talk about mistakes
in patient care in those settings, however, does not necessarily trans-
late into a willingness to use information about those events to struc-
ture systematic changes to prevent future errors or to facilitate an
institutional response to a patient who has been harmed. In the long
run, however, understanding and responding to information about er-
rors that are identified at work rounds and clinical meetings may help
improve the quality of care, minimize the number of suits, and demon-
113. Under the more limited Texas model, 36.3% would not be able to sue. An additional
48.6% had both errors that involved tangible property and errors that did not. Depending on
which errors were seen as the proximate cause of the injury, these additional patients might not
be able to sue.
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strate that a hospital is taking seriously the harm to patients caused by
departures from optimal care.
Part of the difficulty is that physicians think of themselves as inde-
pendent contractors, as in the early days of the profession. But the
delivery of health care services has changed so drastically in the past
two decades that it is counterproductive in terms of health care quality
for physicians to claim independence and to assert individual
fiefdoms. The professionals in a modern hospital are interdepen-
dent-they need to use hospital equipment, supplies from the phar-
macy, and information from other medical and surgical services, as
well as other hospital entities. As the prospective observational study
points out, one quarter of the errors are caused by these interactive
and administrative aspects of hospital life. The human costs and the
financial costs of error are high. A 1997 study pegged the costs of
drug errors in hospitals to $1.56 billion in hospital costs alone. 114 If
follow-up costs related to outpatient care and disability were included,
it could be as much as $79 billion annually.11 5
Perhaps by making hospitals responsible for all errors, there can be
a more uniform system in place to deal with both errors due to actions
of individual health care providers and errors due to problems of the
larger hospital system. This study found that currently very little in-
formation about either type of error was passed on to the hospital
administration, the Patient Safety Committee, or the risk management
personnel. Adopting new theories of liability would create a greater
incentive for providers and hospitals to monitor errors, thus providing
the foundation for efforts to prevent errors.
114. See generally David C. Classen et al., Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients: Ex-
cess Length of Stay, Extra Costs, and Attributable Mortality, 277 JAMA 301 (1997).
115. Id. at 304.
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